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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
. WERNER KIEPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Cross Respondent, 
vs. 
; ELI D. LECHEMINANT, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross Appellant 
Ca.se No. 
10310 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF AND 
BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Na-
ture of the Case made by Appellant and with Appel-
lant's statement of Disposition of the Case Made in 
Lower Court. 
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Respondent does not agree with all the State-
ment of Facts stated by Appellant and particularly 
as to Appellant's statement of overcharges to cus-
tomers made by Respondent. Were this appeal from 
the final judgment, then that part of Appellant's 
Statement of Facts pertaining to the case resulting 
in the judgment entered on March 12, 1964 not here-
in objected to might be in order but the only record 
of the case on which this appeal is taken is that made 
subsequent to the judgment entered March 12, 1964. 
To go behind this record is unimportant and simply 
confuses the facts as to the real issue on this appeal. 
Appellant states on pages 5 and 6 of his brief, 
that from January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964, 
the partners continued to operate the business in 
the same manner as they had done prior to notice 
of dissolution. In this we do not fully agree. The 
fact as shown by the record is that while the part-
ners continued on in the same office, appellant took 
into his possession and under his control, the ap-
praisal business and records, claiming those assets 
as his own and not partnership assets and Appellant 
conducted his own independent appraisal business. 
He did not intend that Respondent participate in 
the income, therefrom, while Respondent carried 
on the mortgage loan and insurance business of the 
partnership, from which Appellant expected to and 
did at all times participate in the income, just as 
he did prior to the dissolution of the partnership. 
Appellant devoted the whole of his time to his ap-
praisal business. The only question before the cm:rt 
is what is the equitable basis under which the parties 
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nperated for a period of thirteen months, from the 
date of dissolution to the final breaking off date. 
The attention of the court is directed to the fact 
that this phase of the case was not made an issue 
br the pleadings. The trial court retained jurisdic-
tion, after having entered its judgment on the case, 
at the request of counsel, to settle the controversy 
which had arisen between the parties as to this thir-
teen month period of time when the parties could 
not resolve their differences. The Order from which 
the appeal is taken was initiated not by any plead-
ings but upon application of Respondent for an 
Order to Show Cause why Appellant should not be 
found in contempt of court for having failed to com-
ply with the judgment of the court which was made 
· and entered on March 12, 1964. At this hearing, on 
Respondent's application, both parties initiated the 
matter of accountings for the thirteen month period 
subsequent to the date of dissolution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AWARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPOND-
ENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 
1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
As is heretofore stated, not only are there no 
pleadings or findings to support this award under 
the order appealed from as contended by Appellant, 
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but there are no pleadings, findings and conclusions 
to support that part of the order which appellant 
is willing to have stand and to have enforced against 
Respondent, that which benefits appellant, from 
which respondent takes his cross-appeal, that part 
of the judgment pertaining to salaries awarded to 
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen and charged 
against partnership operation. 
Appellant refers to the Order from which his 
appeal is taken as "this part of the judgment." We 
contend that this is not a part of the judgment but 
it is simply collateral to and in aid of the final judg-
ment, in enforcement of the judgment. If it is not 
in enforcement of the judgment then the matters 
considered by the court and on which the Order 
appealed from was entered, was separate and apart 
from, and collateral to those issues framed by the 
pleadings and to those rights asserted in the action 
proper, and therefore no findings and conclusions 
were necessary. It is to be noted that the parties 
waived findings and conclusions in the case proper. 
That which brought the matter before the court was 
as is heretofore stated, on application of respondent 
for an Order to Show Cause why Appellant should 
not be found in contempt for having failed to comply 
with the judgment of the court. 
The action is an equitable action, and contrary 
to the argument of Appellant that the court heard 
no evidence to support its order, the court did hear 
evidence and had theretofore indicated to counsel 
that it intended to award some compensation to Re-
~pondent for his having preserYed the mortgage loan 
asset of the partnership, and having retained juris-
diction of the case at the request of both counsel the 
case having been tried piece meal, exercised its equit-
able powers in entering its order allowing compen-
sation to respondent for his services rendered. The 
parties agreed to submit this phase of the case to 
the court and to abide by its decision. Therefore an 
appeal from the ruling is not in order, nor is the 
order appealed from an appealable order. 
Appellant cannot come into a court of equity 
and seek to avail himself of the benefits of that part 
of an order beneficial to him and object to that part 
of the order which is not beneficial to him, which it 
is apparent appellant seeks to do, this especially when 
· he is faced with the same omission, if there is an 
omission, as that complained of. Here the court 
awarded, and charged against the partnership in-
. come, the salary of a clerk whom respondent had 
discharged and who had been rehired by appellant, 
after respondent had stated to appellant that if he 
reemployed the party discharged Appellant would 
be required to pay her salary; and a clerk whom 
appellant brought into his employment to learn the 
ousiness, after dissolution, one who had never been 
an employee of the partnership, none of this is sup-
ported by pleadings, findings or conclusions. 
Respondent finds no fault with the authorities 
cited and relied upon by appellant, but they are not 
applicable in this case. 
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Appellant points out the fact that the court 
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in or-
dering that all income received by each party from 
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 is to be dis-
tributed in the same manner and as is provided by 
the partnership agreement and as has heretofore 
been received and distributed, and that neither part-
ner will receive any compensation for services dur-
ing this interim period. It is evident however that 
when such recommendation was made by Respond-
ent's counsel it was assuming that the partnership 
agreement if invoked, would be invoked in all as-
pects. This would require the consent of Respond-
ent to the employment of those not employed by 
the partnership. Thus Respondent would be pro-
tected and would not be compelled to pay one-half 
the salary of such employees. (See R. 83) 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD 
OF $2,500 TO THE RESPONDENT WAS MADE 
BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 
WAS TRIED ON FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND 
WAS ADJUDGED AGAINST THE RESPOND-
ENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, I 
WHICH JUDGMENT HAD BECOME FINAL 1 
AND WAS RES ADJUDICATA OF SAID ISSUE 
AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE JUDG-
MENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964. 
Appellant bases this argument on the ground 1• 
that the a ward made by the court to respondent was 
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an issue, it was not made an issue by any pleading 
but was simply an announcement by a court of equity 
in its arriving at a settlement of a dispute arising 
after the court had rendered judgment, and after 
counsel for the parties had requested that the court 
retain jurisdiction of the case to settle the dispute. 
It is evident that appellant would take advantage 
of his having led respondent into believing that ap-
pellant's net income was considerably more than 
appellant later showed his net income to be, and in 
counsels in reliance on such representation and rec-
, ommending to the court that which he considered 
a fair division of income and expenses, which recom-
mendation the court adopted. Respondent later found 
when the true facts were made known, which facts 
were much different from those represented by ap-
pellant, that not only would respondent sustain a 
substantial loss from participating in any income of 
appellant but Respondent would expose his income 
to ridiculously high operation costs resulting in a 
much different award than had been anticipated. 
Appellant testified as follows: 
Altogether I've had $28,825.00 of total 
appraisal work finished so that my income for 
1963 amounts to over $30,000.00, to Mr. Le-
Cheminant's $8,900.00. This is the problem 
we each have half of that 50-50. But I have 
against that some $10,000 personal expenses 
which I have paid. (R. 93) 
Appellant did not deny having made such rep-
, resentation as is evidenced by the following testi-
mony (R. 106, Vol. 2): 
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~· Do you recalJ, Mr. Kiepe, in the trial 
of this case the quest10n arose as to what you 
you would estimate your income for 1963 and 
January ?f '64, would be? An~ the exp~ndi­
tures against that for the earnmg of it? If I 
remember .correctly you sta~ed that it would 
be approximately $28,000 income with ex-
penditures of about $10,000 against that? 
A. Well, I remember being asked the 
question, and I did make some estimates, but 
now I have the true and actual facts, item by 
item. 
In reliance on this representation, and assum-
ing there would be approximately $20,000 go into 
the partnership account through appellant's earn-
ings, the above referred to recommendation was 
made by respondent's counsel. It is evident that the 
court considered there would be sufficient income 
realized by respondent from appellant's earnings to 
offset any additional award which the court had 
therefore indicated it would make to respondent for 
his services in preserving the assets of the partner-
ship represented by the mortgage loan business. The 
court realizing the inequity resulting, and to correct 
this inequitable situation stated that as it had re-
tained jurisdiction of the case it made the award of 
the $2,500.00. 
The evidence shows the difficulty responden,t 
faced in compelling appellant to render an account-
ing of his earnings as ordered by the court, and in 
having appellant, each time the matter was brought 
before the court, furnishing a different account, 
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finally forcing Respondent to obtain an Order To 
Show Cause. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD OF $2,500 TO RESPONDENT 
BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 
IS NOT ONLY NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEAD-
INGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE GIVEN AT 
THE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND 
IS CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
This point is covered by respondent's argument 
under Point II, with this additional statement. Ap-
pellant argues at page 26 of his brief that respondent 
took care of the mortgage loan asset for many 
years before 1963, but received no special compen-
sation therefore in addition to his fees for making 
loans and commissions on insurance written with 
the loans. We point out however that respondent 
was, during that period of time participating in in-
come from the appraisal business of appellant of 
which approximately 50 % went into partnership 
income which was divided equally between the par-
ties after the proportionate share of expenses had 
been charged against this income. This operating 
expense was agreed upon by the parties by their part-
nership agreement, that neither party would incur 
expense against the partnership in excess of $10 
without first obtaining the approval of the other 
partner. 
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Appellant argues that the amount of time re-
spondent devoted to the preservation of the mortgage 
loan business did not justify the award made by 
the court. The court having heard the evidence con-
cluded that respondent had earned the amount 
awarded to respondent. As to the contention that 
the insurance company whose money was being 
loaned by the partnership severely reprimanded re-
spondent for the manner in which their business was 
conducted is not borne out by the record when that 
part of the record containing the testimony of re-
spondent in explaining the situation is considered. 
POINT IV 
THE AW ARD OF A BONUS OF $535 TO 
EACH OF THE PARTIES IN THE JUDGMENT 
OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT, NOR 
BY ANY EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE. 
This point is predicated entirely upon an ac-
counting principal which the court considered. Ap-
pellant had, according to his accounting submitted, 
received his revised bonuses over and above the 50% 
awarded in the original judgment and the court, 
in order to place both parties on the same bonus 
basis awarded this item to Respondent. 
POINT V 
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
NOVEMBER 9, 1964 WHICH READS: "THIS 
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BRINGS TOTAL CREDITS TO WHICH DE-
FENDANT IS ENTITLED THE SUM OF $20,-
101.93, LESS REFUNDS OF $3,668.71 * * * RE-
SULTS IN A NET BALANCE CREDIT TO 
WHICH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO $16,-
433.23 OUT OF THE CASH ON HAND OF $28,-
723.98 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF 
FACT OR BY ANY EVIDENCE. 
The same is true of this item as that item under 
Point IV. This is arrived at out of the accounting 
submitted not by Respondent but by Appellant. The 
trial court being an accountant himself concluded 
this was a correct interpretation of the account. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
OF MARCH 12, 1964. 
Appellant is most inconsistent in his position 
on the whole of this case, in arguing under Point II 
that the award of $2,500 made by the court is res 
adjudicata, then under this point Appellant would 
go back of the judgment which was entered on March 
12, 1964, and he assigns as error the court's refusal 
to correct that which appellant contends was a typo-
graphical mistake many months after the judgment 
had been entered. True counsel for respondent did 
state that if there was an error he would consent to 
its being corrected, but after consulting with re-
spondent it was determined that no error existed. 
12 
The court did not refuse to correct an apparent error 
as appellant would have this Honorable court be-
lieve. 
That which the court did was to suggest to coun-
sel if an error appeared to request the court to cor-
rect same. Respondent found no error as charged. 
CROSS APPEAL OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order made and en-
tered on November 9th, 1964 awarding Respondent 
the sum of $2,500 for preserving the mortgage loan 
assets of a partnership when respondent had asked 
for $5,000; from the award under said order of com-
pensation to Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen as 
partnership expense; from a charge against re-
spondent of $400 ( 1h of $800) fee charged by Ap-
pellant's accountant and in awarding Respondent 
out of funds on hand the sum of $16,433.32 when 
Respondent was entitled to an amount in excess of 
said sum. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE 
IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered an Order on November 
9th, 1964 which provided among other things : 
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1. That the Respondent be awarded $2,500.00 
for "preserving the mortgage loan assets of the part-
nership." 
2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to each 
of the parties. 
3. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled 
to total credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,-
668.71. 
4. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled 
to net credits of $16,443.22. · 
5. Adjudging that compensation paid to Ruth 
Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as 
partnership expense and be born equally by the part-
ners. 
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawrence 
S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be 
a partnership expense and borne equally by the 
partners. 
7. Awarding Respondent a net balance credit 
of $16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28, 723.90. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
Cross Appellant seeks reversal of the following 
portions of the Judgment or Order dated November 
9, 1964 and judgment in his favor as follows, to-wit: 
1. A warding to respondent (cross appellant) 
the sum of $5,000 for respondent's services in pre-
serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership. 
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2. Adjudging that the compensation paid to 
Ruth Barlow is not an expense of the partnership 
and should be borne by appellant. 
3. Adjudging that the compensation paid to R. 
L. Christensen is not an expense of the partnership 
and should be borne by appellant. 
4. Adjudging that the fee paid Lawrence S. 
Pinnock is not an expense of the partnership and 
should be borne by appellant. 
5. A warding to respondent out of the cash on 
hand of the partnership, the sum of $22,098.22 be-
ing the sum of $16,433.22 awarded, plus one-half thr 
compensation of Ruth Barlow of $2,550.00 or $1,-
275.00; one-half the compensation of R. L. Christen-
sen of $2,970.00 or $1,485.00; one-half the fee paid 
to Lawrence S. Pinnock of $800 or $400.00, and an 
additional $2,500 for services in preserving the mort-
gage loan asset of the partnership. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cross Appellant and Cross Respondent entered 
into a written partnership agreement the business 
of which partnership commenced under said agree-
ment on October 1, 1943 ( R 3), which provided 
among other things that each partner should work 
for the partnership on a basis of a salesman's com-
mission, which should be 50 % of any commissions 
accruing from the listing, sale, rental, or appraisal 
of real estate, or from insurance commissions. That 
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the partnership should be on a 50-50 basis as to costs 
and profits. That disbursements from a joint check-
ing account shall be made over the signature of both 
partners, and that neither partner will incur an ob-
ligation in the name of the partnership in excess of 
$10 without first obtaining the approval of the other 
partner. That the agreement as to percentage of divi-
sion of commissions was later orally amended which 
is unimportant on this cross-appeal. 
Cross Respondent served written notice of dis-
solution of the partnership upon Cross Appellant on 
December 30, 1962, to become effective February 1, 
1963. The partners continued to conduct business at 
the same location, under the same firm name, with 
some of the same employees, sharing the partner-
ship office in the same manner after February 1, 
, 1963 as before. Cross Appellant who had, prior to 
dissolution for many years, managed the mortgage 
loan business of the partnership, and who recognized 
this business as an asset of the partnership, con-
tinued to manage this business of the partnership 
as he had done previous to the dissolution, but Cross 
Appellant conducted some little real estate and in-
surance business of his own. Cross Respondent de-
rnted the whole of his time to the conducting of his 
appraisal business, spending no time whatsoever in 
the mortgage loan business of the partnership, this 
relationship continued for a period of thirteen 
months after February 1, 1963. The parties were un-
able to agree on a division of assets, and in the wind-
ing up of the partnership business, as a result Cross 
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Respondent filed action against Cross-Appellant for 
an accounting which resulted in a judgment entered 
by the court on March 12, 1964. Neither party to the 
action had by any pleading asked for a determina-
tion of the rights of the parties during the thirteen 
month period subsequent to the cutting off date of 
the partnership as of February 1, 1963. When the 
parties were unable to agree on an equitable division 
of income and expenses during this thirteen month 
period the parties sought the aid of the court to 
settle this controversy which the court did and which 
resulted in the Order herein appealed from. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING 
CROSS APPELLANT THE SUM OF $5,000 
WHICH WAS THE SUM ASKED BY CROSS AP-
PELLANT FOR HIS EFFORTS AND SERVICE 
DURING THE LAST THIRTEEN MONTHS IN 
PRESERVING THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP. 
It is evident from the testimony of Cross Ap-
pellant that at the time notice of dissolution of the 
partnership was served on him there was nearly 
seven million dollars of mortgage loan business han-
dled by Cross Appellant for the partnership; that · l 
there were some 600 accounts which required some 
service every month in order to keep the accounts 
current. This business was carried on by Cross Ap- , 3 
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pellant for the thirteen month period. As the mort-
gage loan account could have been cancelled by the 
mortgage loan company because of the dissolution, 
it was important that extra effort be made to service 
these accounts in a creditable manner. As a result 
of the service performed by Cross Appellant, this 
asset which it is evident was a very valuable one was 
preserved. Cross Appellant testified in detail to the 
service rendered by him in preserving this asset, 
(R 13-25, Vol. 2). Cross Respondent benefited 
through these services of Cross Appellant and re-
ceived his share of the profits from this operation 
while at the same time Cross Respondent devoted 
the whole of his time to his appraisal business. 
The sum of $5,000 asked for by Cross Appel-
, !ant was most modest and should have been allowed 
by the court. 
The case might be likened to one where in-
stead of Cross Respondent remaining in the same 
office and conducting his private business there-
from, he takes a trip to Hawaii for a period of thir-
teen months during which time Cross Appellant 
carries on the partnership business. We think Cross 
Respondent would make no objection to an allow-
ance by the court for Cross Appellant's services dur-
ing that time. This case is no different. Or it is like 
a case where Cross Respondent might have died and 
have his interest pass to his estate, Cross Appellant 
carries on the business. Such was the holding in the 
case of Puffer v. Merton, 168 Wis. 366, 170 NW 
, 368, 5 ALR 1288 involving a law partnership where 
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one of the partners died and the firm had on hand 
no contingent fee cases but all business held by it 
was on the usual general retainer basis where its 
clients could have dispensed with the services of 
the firm. The court said: 
Neither can it be said that the conduct-
ing to a conclusion of law business on hand 
at the time of the death of a partner is simply 
a winding up of the partnership. It is more 
than that; it is a continuation of business 
after the partnership has ceased to exist. Often 
such continuation may require years of hard 
work for completion. Hence it is not equitable 
that the estate of a deceased partner which 
has contributed nothing towards such work 
should share in its compensation. Citing Row-
ell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COM-
PENSATION PAID TO RUTH BARLOW AS A 
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE B 0 RN E 
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS 
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,550.00. 
Cross Appellant discharged Ruth Barlow short-
ly before February 1, 1963, and after some period 
of time Cross Respondent rehired her. It is evident 
from the testimony in the record that Ruth Barlow 
devoted the greater part of her time in reviewing 
records and accounts in an effort to make a case out 
against Cross Appellant. Her services were not 
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needed by the partnership, neither were her services 
required in the winding up of the business of the part-
nership. At the time Cross Respondent rehired this 
party, Cross Appellant told Cross Respondent that 
if he hired Ruth, Cross Respondent would be re-
quired to pay her salary, that Cross Appellant would 
not, nor would he consent to the partnership paying 
same. Even when Cross Appellant signed salary 
checks for Ruth Barlow he advised Cross Respond-
ent that he would look to the amount to come out of 
and be charged to the account of Cross Respondent. 
The evidence shows by Exhibit 22, that on Feb-
ruary 5, 1963, Cross Appellant addressed a letter 
to Cross Respondent which is in part as follows: 
Now concerning Ruth. I will not agree to 
increasing the overhead in any way during 
the period of the partnership dissolution. I 
told Ruth the day she went to the hospital of 
the dissolution and that I would call her as 
soon as this problem was resolved. At the pres-
ent time we do not need more than a part time 
girl. Linda is doing in a half day all the work 
done by Ruth in a full day. If you insist on 
rehiring Ruth before the dissolution is com-
plete you should pay her salary. I invoke the 
terms of the partnership agreement on this 
point. 
If we apply the provisions of Section 48-1-27 
UCA 1953 which is as follows: 
PARTNERSHIP NOT TERMINATED BY 
DISSOLUTION. 
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. On dissolutio~ a part~ership is not tel'-
m1nated, but continues until the winding up 
of partnership affairs is completed. 
Cross Respondent had no right to reemploy Ruth 
Barlow inasmuch as the provisions of the partner-
ship agreement continued in force until dissolution 
under the above quoted section. 
The partnership agreement as to the right to 
incur obligations by either partner on behalf of the 
partnership provides that neither partner will incur 
an obligation in the name of the partnership in ex-
cess of $10.00, without obtaining the approval of 
the other partner. 
If it should be contended that the partnership 
agreement is not in force after dissolution and dur-
ing the winding up period, then Cross Respondent 
cannot claim this i tern as an expense inasmuch as 
Cross Respondent had not shown in any respect that 
Ruth Barlow's services were required in the winding ' 
up process of the partnership, or to complete trans-
actions begun but not finished as provided by Sec-
tion 48-1-30 UCA 1953 which reads as follows: 
Except as far as may be necessary to 
wind up partnership affairs or to comple.te 
transactions begun but not then finished, dis· 
solution terminates all authority of any part-
ner to act for the partnership. 
Therefore Cross Respondent cut off all author-
ity to employ Ruth Barlow or anyone else, unless 
agreed to by Cross Appellant, by his having served 
notice of dissolution on Cross Appellant. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COM-
PENSATION PAID TOR. L. CHRISTENSEN AS 
A PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE BORNE 
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS ITEM 
. AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,970.00. 
R. L. Christensen was never an employee of the 
partnership. He was employed by Cross Respondent 
subsequent to dissolution to learn the business. It 
, is evident that Mr. Christensen did not take the place 
· of another employee of the partnership and the rec-
ord contains not a word of evidence that the services 
of Mr. Christensen were necessary in the winding 
up of the business of the partnership. Cross Respond-
ent was never consulted nor did he at any time con-
sent to the employment of Mr. Christensen. 
For the same reasons as argued under Point II, 
this charge against the partnership is not proper. 
There are no pleadings or findings to support 
either this award or that under Point II. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE 
FEE OF LAWRENCE S. PINNOCK, CERTIFIED 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, AS A PARTNERSHIP 
EX P E N S E, PAID FROM PARTNERSHIP 
FUNDS AND BORNE EQUALLY BY THE PART-
NERS. THIS ITEM AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF 
$800.00. 
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After Cross Appellant had objected to several 
accountings furnished to Cross Respondent, Cross 
Respondent engaged the services of Mr. Pinnock to 
examine accounts, not of the partnership, or of Cross 
Appellant, but accounts, items of which reflected 
the earnings of Cross Respondent during the thir-
teen month period subsequent to the February 1, 
1963 date. Cross Appellant did not consent to, nor 
did he agree at any time that he would pay any part 
of the fee paid to Mr. Pinnock. For the same reasons 
as relied upon under Points II and III this is not a 
proper charge against the partnership. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT CROSS APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF THE 
CASH ON HAND OF $28,723.98. 
This item results in the assumption that the 
Cross Appeal of Cross Appellant will be favorable 
to Cross Appellant on all points relied upon, in which 
case the award to Cross Appellant should be $22,-
093.22 and not the sum of $16,433.22 awarded to 
Cross Appellant by the Order appealed from. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent and Cross Appellant submits ' 
that the law and the evidence requires: 
That the Order appealed from by appellant be 
affirmed except as to those Points on which Cross 
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Appellant assigns as errors in the following par-
ticulars: 
(a) That Cross Appellant be awarded the sum 
' of $5,000 for services rendered by him in the preser-
vation of the mortgage loan asset of the partner-
1 ship. 
(b) That the allowance of compensation paid 
to Ruth Barlow as a partnership expense to be borne 
equally by the partners be set aside. 
( c) That the allowance of compensation paid 
to R. L. Christensen as a partnership expense to be 
: borne equally by the partners be set aside. 
( d) That the allowance of fee of Lawrence S. 
I Pinnock, as a partnership expense be set aside. 
1 
( c) That the finding that Cross Appellant is 
i entitled to receive the sum of $16,433.22 out of the 
, cash on hand of $28, 723.98 be set aside, and that 
. Cross Appellant be awarded the sum of $22,093.22 
1 out of said sum. 
I 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN 
& CLARK, 
1111 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent and Cross 
Appellant 
